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Abstract— Cloud computing is a popular distributed network 
and utility model based technology. Since in cloud the data is 
outsourced to third parties, the protection of confidentiality 
and privacy of user data becomes important. Different 
methods for securing the data in cloud have been proposed by 
researchers including but not limited to Oblivious RAM, 
Searchable Encryption, Functional Encryption, Homomorphic 
Encryption etc. This paper focuses on Searchable and 
Homomorphic Encryption methods. Finally, a comparative 
study of these two efficient cloud cryptographic methods has 
been carried out and given here. 
Keywords- Cloud Computing; Security; Homomorphic 
Encryption; Searchable Encryption 
I.  SECURITY IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
Cloud Computing is a distributed network meant for 
providing service by cloud provider to the consumers on 
rental basis [1]. Owners of data store their data in cloud 
which therefore need to be secured. By storing data in 
encrypted form, one can maintain the confidentiality and 
privacy of data in cloud. Many cryptographic methods have 
been devised to address the issue of confidentiality and 
privacy of owner’s data in cloud. An in-depth survey has 
been done on cloud related security issues, challenges and 
cryptographic algorithms by Prasanna and Akki [2]. Among 
them homomorphic and searchable encryption methods are 
most popular, where one can perform computation and 
search on ciphertext without disclosing plaintext. The 
authors focus more on these two techniques in this paper. 
       
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses 
criteria’s used for developing Homomorphic Encryption 
methods. The section also briefs some of the known Fully 
Homomorphic Encryption methods and their corresponding 
technologies used. Section 3 focuses on related work on 
Searchable Encryption methods and different criteria’s used 
to categorize them. Section 4 compares different known 
cloud cryptographic methods using efficiency and security as 
parameters. Section 5 concludes with an utter need of 
efficient cryptographic methods like Searchable Encryption 
for further study and research.  
II. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 
In cloud, the primary concern is of maintaining both 
confidentiality and privacy of owner’s data from untrusted 
users. The concept of homomorphism introduced in 1978, 
by Rivest et al [3], can be used for securing the data stored 
in cloud from unauthorized users.  
 
Two messages m1 and m2 are encrypted by using any 
known encryption method E with public or private key pk, 
where C1 and C2 are their corresponding ciphertexts (i.e. 
C1= Epk (m1) and C2= Epk (m2)). The HE scheme performs 
computation like addition, multiplication etc. between C1 
and C2 without decryption. The obtained result is also in 
encrypted form. The general architecture of the HE scheme 
is shown in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. General architecture of Homomorphic Encryption 
 
As shown in figure 1, user performs computation on 
encrypted data in cloud. Which in turn preserves the privacy 
and security of user data in cloud.  
 
The HE algorithms are designed and developed using 
different mathematical constructs. Each HE algorithm is 
developed mainly based on two factors: Hardness of 
breaking the security of encryption and Efficiency (in terms 
of time) of execution of encryption, decryption processes. 
Numerous HE models have been proposed based on certain 
criteria. 
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A.  Classification Of HE’s: 
Based on keys used HE schemes can be symmetric, 
asymmetric and hybrid. Further HE methods can be broadly 
classified into Partial Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) and 
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). PHE performs only 
a limited number of operations for example either addition 
or multiplication on encrypted data. FHE performs both 
addition and subtraction operations on encrypted data many 
times. Based on ciphertext generated, an encryption scheme 
can be probabilistic or deterministic. In probabilistic 
encryption each time a plaintext encrypted, results in 
different ciphertext, whereas deterministic encryption, 
always results in the same ciphertext. To secure the 
encryption or decryption process, different mathematical 
constructs are used like composite residuocity, high degree 
residuocity and quadratic residuocity. Trapdoor functions 
are used to secure data in HE. They are one way functions 
used during encryption and decryption process. Different 
mathematical constructs are used to create trapdoors. In 
Malleable cryptosystems a given ciphertext can be 
transformed to another by adversary to get plaintext. 
Versatility of a HE scheme is its ability to support many 
circuits to do computation on encrypted data. Versatility 
should be high to support more operations on encrypted 
data. Efficiency of HE schemes is considered to be good if 
generated ciphertext size is small and time taken to run 
encryption, decryption or recryption process is less. Table 1, 
lists some of the criteria’s considered during design and 
development of HE schemes. 
 
Some of the known PHE methods include Unpadded 
RSA, ElGamal, Goldwasser-Micali, Benaloh, Paillier, 
Okamoto-Uchiyama, Naccache-Stern, Damgard-Jurik and 
Boneh-Goh-Nissim etc. Some of the known FHE methods 
are Gentry, Van Dijk, Smart-Vercauteren, Stehle-Steinfield, 
Ogura, Lyubashevsky, Gentry-Halevi, Brakerski-
Vaikuntanathan, Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan and 
Chunsheng etc. Prasanna and Akki [2] in their survey paper 
discussed different known PHE and FHE schemes along 
with their limitations and benefits.  
 
Table 1: HE schemes criteria’s and types 
Criteria Types 
Trapdoor functions 
1. Polynomial over finite field 
2. Discrete logarithms over groups 
HE schemes 
1. Partial homomorphic encryption.  
2.Fully homomorphic encryption 
Encryption method 
1. Probabilistic encryption.  
2.Deterministic encryption 
Hardness of encryption 
1. Composite Residuosity.  
2. High     degree Residuosity.  
3. Quadratic Residuosity 
Malleability 
1. Malleable.  
2. Non Malleable 
Versatility 
1. Versatile.  
2. Non Versatile 
Efficiency based on computation 
speed 
1. Encryption.  
2. Decryption 
3. Recryption 
Efficiency based on ciphertext 
size 
1. Small ciphertext size  
2. Large ciphertext size 
Practical or not 
1. Practically implementable.  
2.Practically complex to implement  
Cryptosystem 
1. Symmetric.  
2. Asymmetric. 
3. Hybrid 
B. Preliminaries (HE): 
The mathematical terms used in Table 2 and Table 3 are 
defined here: 
Ideal lattices: Lattices were first studied by 
mathematicians Joseph Louis Lagrange and Carl Friedrich 
Gauss. In 1996, Miklos Ajtai and Micciancio [4] discussed 
the use of lattices as cryptography primitive. Micciancio 
defined lattices as general class of cyclic lattices.  
 
A lattice L is a set of points in the n-
dimensional Euclidean space Rn with a strong property of 
periodicity. A basis of L is a set of vectors such that any 
element of L is uniquely represented as their linear 
combination with integer coefficients. When n is at least 2, 
each lattice has infinitely many different bases. All lattices 
over Rn have infinitely many elements, whereas in 
cryptography entities such as the ciphertext, public key, and 
private key must be taken from a finite space (bit strings of 
some fixed length). Therefore the lattices used for 
cryptography are actually lattices over a finite field. 
 
There are two types of lattice based mathematical 
problems. They are the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and 
the Closest Vector Problem (CVP). SVP: Given a basis of a 
lattice, find the shortest vector in the lattice. CVP: Given a 
basis of a lattice and a vector not in the lattice, find the 
lattice vector with the least distance to the first vector. 
Lattice based cryptography refers to any system whose 
security depends on computational assumptions based on 
lattices. 
 
Approximate GCD: Approximate GCD is a difficult 
problem of symbolic-numeric computation. Some of the 
algorithms try to guess the near approximate solution of the 
given problem, later the accuracy and precision of the 
obtained approximate solution is improved. The 
approximate GCD is used to find one or more divisors 
which is the greatest common divisor of the approximate 
numbers a and b of two given numbers a0 and b0. 
 
Algebraic number theory: Algebraic number theory is 
a branch of number theory that studies algebraic 
structures related to algebraic integers. This is generally 
accomplished by considering a ring of algebraic 
integers O in an algebraic number field, and studying their 
algebraic properties such as factorization, the behavior 
of ideals, and field extensions. 
 
Sparse Subset Sum Problem: The subset sum 
problem is an important problem in complexity 
theory and cryptography. The problem deals with a given 
set of integers, and finding a non-empty subset whose sum 
is zero. For example, given the set {−7, −3, −2, 5, 8}, the 
answer is yes because the subset {−3, −2, 5} sums to zero. 
The problem is NP-complete. 
 
Learning with Error (LWE): The LWE is a 
generalization of the parity learning problem. The LWE 
problem is to distinguish random linear equations, which 
has been perturbed by a small amount of noise, from truly 
uniform ones. The problem has been shown to be as hard as 
worst-case lattice problems.  
 
An algorithm is said to solve the LWE problem if, when 
given access to samples  where    
   and    with the assurance, for some 
fixed linear function ,  that  
  with high probability and deviates from it 
according to some known noise mode, the algorithm can 
recreate or some close approximation of it with high 
probability. Where n is positive integer, q is odd prime and f 
is a linear function. 
 
Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE): For a 
polynomial ring  and a random 
polynomial   , it is computationally hard to 
distinguish the uniform distribution over  from 
ordered pairs of the form , where  are 
uniformly distributed in   and  are polynomials in   
whose coefficients are independently distributed Gaussians. 
 
Nth degree Truncated polynomial ring (NTRU): 
The NTRU Encrypt public key cryptosystem, also known as 
the NTRU encryption algorithm, is a lattice-
based alternative to RSA and ECC (Elliptic Curve 
Cryptosystem) and is based on the shortest vector 
problem in a lattice. 
C. Fully Homomorphic Encryptions(FHE): 
In 2009, Gentry for the first time introduced the concept 
of FHE. After that many researchers contributed towards 
making FHE practical. 
 
Some of the known FHE methods and their 
corresponding technologies involved are listed in Table 2. 
Table 3 compares different FHE schemes based on LWE 
technique. 
 
Size of different parameters mentioned in Table 3 is 
almost same. The BGV and Vercauteren schemes are based 
on RLWE, and uses less number of bits compared to BV 
and Brakerski schemes. Vercauteren scheme uses less 
number of bits for secret and public key in turn increases the 
processing speed of homomorphic encryption. 
 
The main drawback of using HE schemes in cloud is its 
complex mathematical constructs involved. Encryption, 
decryption and recryption processes involving these 
mathematical constructs take more time for processing. 
Researchers are working towards improving the security of 
HE schemes while maintaining efficiency (in terms of time) 
of these algorithms. 
III. SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION 
Homomorphic Encryption schemes have been surveyed 
so far to address the issue of privacy and confidentiality. 
The same issues can also be addressed by using one more 
efficient cryptographic tool called Searchable Encryption. 
The general architecture of SE schemes is shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. General Architecture of SE Schemes 
 
As shown in figure 2, data owner encrypts the document and 
correponding index fils and uploads the same into cloud. In 
cloud, the keywords(trapdoor)sent by clients is used for 
search and retrived encrypted document is sent to the 
clients. 
 
SE maintains the confidentiality and privacy of owner’s 
data by facilitating searching keywords directly on encrypted 
data. Users can upload their encrypted data to cloud. Later, 
the authorized users can perform private keyword search on 
encrypted data in cloud. Multiple domains like cryptography, 
indexing, storage etc. are involved in devising efficient, 
secure, SE algorithms over encrypted files. The participants 
of a secure search model in a cloud, typically involves data 
owner, data user and cloud server. Data owner encrypts the 
files and corresponding keywords based index files by using 
any known cryptographic algorithms. Both the encrypted 
files and index files are uploaded to the cloud server. To 
search for keywords data user requests trapdoors from data 
owner or generates trapdoors himself/herself. These 
trapdoors are used to search encrypted files in cloud server. 
Cloud server searches for the keywords in database and 
encrypted search results are returned to the data user. Many 
researchers are involved in designing and developing SE 
algorithms with having high efficiency (in terms of time). 
         
Table 2: FHE Schemes and Techniques Used 
 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of FHE Schemes Based on LWE 
 
*Where p and q is prime number. n=pxq and d is length in bits. 
A. Related Work: 
Song et al. [5] for the first time proposed practical 
symmetric searchable encryption method. In this scheme the 
file is encrypted word by word. To search for a keyword 
user sends the keyword with same key to the cloud. The 
drawback of this scheme is that the word frequency will be 
revealed. Goh [6] tried to overcome the drawback of Song’s 
scheme by constructing secure index table using 
pseudorandom functions and unique document identifier 
randomized bloom filters. Bosch et al. [18] worked on the 
concept given by Goh et al. and introduced the concept of 
wild card searches. The drawback of this scheme is that 
bloom filters may introduce false positives. In Chang’s et al. 
[7] proposed scheme, an index is built for each document. 
The scheme is more secured compared to Goh’s scheme 
since number of words in a file is not disclosed. The 
limitation of this scheme is that it is less efficient and does 
not support arbitrary updates with new words. Golle et al. 
[9] scheme allows multiple keyword searches with one 
encrypted query. But this scheme is not practical. Curtmola 
et al.[8] for the first time proposed the concept of symmetric 
searchable encryption (SSE), later on Kamara et al.[23] 
proposed an extended version of SSE called dynamic 
SSE(DSSE), where addition and deletion of documents can 
be performed in index table. Curtmola’s scheme and 
Kamara’s scheme are limited to keyword searches, and 
range queries are not supported. Hacigumus et al. [25] 
proposed an SQL query support by using bucketization 
technique. The drawback is with respect to bucketization 
technique where the scheme does not support scalability. 
Hore et al. [19] proposed a scheme which applies 
bucketization to multi-dimensional data that also supports 
range queries. The limitation is same as in Hacigumus 
scheme, which is of scalability. Order Preserving 
Encryption (OPE) based schemes supports range queries. 
The drawback with the schemes supporting OPE is of 
revealing the order relation between ciphertext data. Popa et 
al. [26] proposed a technique called CryptDB to protect 
databases. CryptDB uses proxy server as an interface to the 
database. Uses range queries and homomorphic encryption 
methods like Paillier scheme for searching and performing 
computations on encrypted data respectively. The drawback 
is of trusting the proxy server. All these schemes are based 
on single user [24]. 
 
The first public key encryption with keyword search 
(PEKS) was proposed by Boneh et al. [15]. The scheme 
suffers from inference attack on trapdoor encryption 
method. Baek et al. [13], Rhee et al. [20] improved hardness 
of security of Boneh’s scheme. Baek’s scheme introduces 
the concept of conjunction of keyword search. The public 
key encryption methods are computationally time 
consuming and complex that makes these algorithms 
inefficient. In Yang et al. [22] scheme the encrypted data is 
searched by individual users using a unique key allotted to 
them. The scheme suffers from key management. Boneh et 
al. [16], [17] discussed functional encryption and related to 
conjunctional search, range queries and subset queries. Katz 
et al. [12] scheme is an updated version of Boneh’s scheme 
[16] and discussed predicate encryption for inner products 
and supports both conjunctions and disjunctions search on 
encrypted data. Shen et al. [21] scheme is based on 
symmetric key and uses predicate encryption. Li et al. [28] 
scheme was based on Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) that 
uses multiple trusted agencies to distribute search capacities 
to users. The drawback of these schemes is key management 
and complex methodologies involved. Cao et al. [11] 
scheme uses multi keyword search technique. Here the 
database owner builds an index table which is very 
expensive and cannot be changed dynamically. All these 
schemes are based on semi fledged multiuser [24]. 
 
Hwang et.al [10] proposed public key encryption with 
conjunctive keyword search (PECK) where multi users can 
be involved. Here the ciphertext size increases linearly with 
FHE Schemes Year Based on 
Gentry  2009 Ideal Lattice 
Van Dijk et al 
(DGHV)  
2010 Approximate GCD 
Smart-Vercauteren  2010 Elementary theory of algebraic number 
fields 
Stehle-Steinfield  2010 Sparse Subset Sum Problem (SSSP) 
Ogura et al  2010 Relation between Circuit depth and 
Eigen Values 
Lyubashevsky et al 2010 Ideal lattice 
Gentry-Halevi 2011 Ideal Lattice Implementation 
Brakerski-
Vaikuntanathan 
2011 Learning with Error (LWE) 
Brakerski-Gentry-
Vaikuntanathan 
(BGV) 
2011 Ring Learning with Error (RLWE) 
Lyubashevsky et al 2012 Ring Learning with Error (RLWE) 
Chunsheng G  2012 Hardness of factoring integer 
Solving Diophantine equation problem 
Finding Approximate GCD problem 
Jean-Sebastien et al  2013 Batch FHE over the integers 
Kurt Rohloff et al  2014 Nth degree Truncated polynomial Ring  
(NTRU) 
Scheme Based on 
Technique 
Secret 
key size 
Public 
key size 
Ciphertext 
size 
BV  LWE n log q O ( n2 
log2 q) 
(n+1) log q 
BGV LWE and 
RLWE 
2d log q 2dn log q 2d  log q 
Brakerski  LWE n log q O ( n2 
log2 q) 
(n+1) log q 
Vercauteren RLWE d 2d log q 2d log q 
the number of users. Bao et al. [14] proposed a scheme 
based on bilinear maps, for multiuser setting. The drawback 
is computational complexity involving bilinear maps. Dong 
et al. [27] proposed a scheme based on Symmetric Data 
Encryption (SDE) and depends on proxy encryption. This 
scheme is efficient in performing search on encrypted data. 
Shao et al. proposed proxy re-encryption with keyword 
search. This scheme involves managing keys that makes this 
scheme inefficient. Muhammad Rizwan Asghar et al. [24] 
propsed a scheme based on full-fledged multi user settings 
and complex query search. This scheme supports SQL like 
queries on encrypted databases. Here the queries are 
represented by using tree data structure. All these schemes 
are based on full-fledged multiuser [24]. 
 
Many scientists across the globe designed numerous SE 
methods. They considered different criteria’s to develop SE 
schemes. The different criteria’s considered to classify the 
SE schemes are discussed in the following sections. 
B. Preliminaries(SE):: 
The following section defines technical terms used in 
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
 
ID based Encryption (IBE): ID-based 
encryption (or Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)) is an 
important primitive of cryptography. The public key 
contains some unique identities of each user hence the name 
IDE. For example the key generation function can use the 
text-value of the name or domain name or the physical IP 
address to generate a public key. 
 
Edit distance: The edit distance between two words w1 
and w2 is the number of operations required to transform one 
of them into the other. The three primitive operations are 1) 
Substitution: changing one character to another in a word; 2) 
Deletion: deleting one character from a word; 3) Insertion: 
inserting a single character into a word. 
 
Bedtree:  All-purpose edit distance based indexing 
scheme using the B+ tree structure. 
 
Predicate Encryption (PE): In PE schemes each 
ciphertext C is associated with a binary attribute vector a = 
(a1... an) and keys K are associated with predicates. A key 
K can decrypt a ciphertext C if and only if the attribute 
vector of the ciphertext satisfies the predicate of the key. 
Predicate encryption schemes can be used to implement 
fine-grained access control on encrypted data and to 
perform search on encrypted data.  
 
Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE): HVE is predicate 
encryption where in each ciphertext C is associated with a 
binary vector a = (a1... an) and each key K is associated 
with binary vector b = (b1... bn) with "don't care" entries. 
Key K can decrypt ciphertext C if and only if a, b agree for 
all i for which bi is not "don't care" entries. 
 
Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP): Whitfield Diffie and 
Martin Hellman proposed a mathematical problem used in 
cryptography. DHP is used to encrypt a message easily, but 
reversing the same encryption is difficult. 
 
The problem statement: “Given an element g and the 
values of gx and gy, what is the value of gxy?” where g is a 
generator of some group and x and y are randomly chosen 
integers. 
 
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH): The decisional 
Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption is a computational 
hardness assumption about a certain problem 
involving discrete logarithms in cyclic groups. It is used as 
the basis to prove the security of 
many cryptographic protocols, most notably 
the ElGamal and Cramer–Shoup cryptosystems. The 
problem statement: Given gx and gy for uniformly and 
independently chosen x, y random integers. The value of gxy 
“looks like” a random element in G. where g is a generator 
and G is a multiplicative cyclic group. 
 
Boolean Keyword Search: Boolean keyword search 
combines keywords with operators like AND, OR, NOT to 
get a result. For example the keyword Bangalore AND 
Mangalore limits the search to the documents that contain 
only these two words. 
 
Fuzzy keyword search algorithms: The Three 
Searching Schemas for Fuzzy Keyword Search over 
Encrypted cloud data are 1.Wildcard Based technique 2. 
Gram based technique 3. Tree traverse search scheme. 
 
Wildcard –Based Technique: This Technique uses 
fuzzy set edits distance to solve the problems. The Edit 
distance can be substitution, Deletion and Insertion. By using 
the Wildcard-Based Technique, the Fuzzy keyword search 
can be more efficient because different edit distance 
techniques are used which can be used to find for finding the 
keywords. 
 
Gram-Based Technique: Another efficient technique 
for constructing fuzzy set is based on grams. The gram of a 
string is a substring that can be used as a signature for 
efficient approximate search. Gram has been widely used 
for constructing Inverted List for approximate string search. 
 
Tree Traverse Search Technique:  The search 
efficiency, tree -traverse search scheme, where a multi-way 
tree is constructed for storing the fuzzy keyword set over a 
finite symbol set. The key idea behind this construction is 
that all trapdoors sharing a common prefix may have 
common nodes. All fuzzy words in the tree can be found by 
a depth-first search. 
 
Index organized by keyword and inverted index: This 
allows fast retrieval of files by using hashing technique. The 
search complexity is constant. 
 
Index constructed per document: This uses linear 
search for number of documents in the database. Search 
time is more. 
 
Tree based index structure: This uses tree data 
structure for search. Search time is considerably less 
compared to index constructed per document method. 
 
Full Domain Based (Linear): One is to perform full-
domain search, in which a search will sequentially go 
through every data item in order to test some criteria. 
 
Index Based: The other is index-based search or 
keyword-based search, where every data item is firstly 
characterized by a list of keywords which are then used to 
build a search index for the data item. Later, when a search 
takes place, the criteria will be tested based on the indexes 
instead of the contents of data items. 
 
Algorithms are broadly categorized into linear or index 
based searchable algorithms depending on search technique 
used. 
C. Classification of SE’s: 
Based on data retrieval, query numbers and their type, 
result, number of participants, security proof models, 
performance, encryption models, search types, evaluation 
parameters etc. SE algorithms have been designed and 
categorized. Table 4 lists some of the known criteria’s used 
to design SE methods. 
 
Two methods of SE found in the literature i.e. private 
and public key methods. In private key method the same key 
is used for both encryption and keyword search. In public 
key scheme different keys are used for encryption and 
keyword search. Public key algorithms are further classified 
based on keyword search types like conjunctive keyword 
search, fuzzy keyword search etc. The general architecture 
of SE is shown in figure 1. 
 
Table 4:   Criteria’s for choosing SE schemes 
Criteria Types 
Factors When searching, what must be protected 1.Retrieved 
Data: The data in cloud (storage). 2. Search Query: 
What to search? 3. Result: Outcome of the query. 
Scenario 1. Single vs Multiple Queries. 2. Adaptive Queries: 
Query depends on previous result. 3. Non Adaptive 
Queries: Multiple Queries, but not related. 
Number of 
participants 
1. Single user can query. 2. Multiple users can query. 
Security proof 
models 
1. Random Oracle model. 2. Standard model. 
Number of 
keywords used 
for searching 
1. Single Keyword. 2. Multiple keywords. 
Encryption 
techniques 
1. Symmetric encryption. 2. Asymmetric or public key 
encryption. 
Searching 
techniques 
1. Searchable symmetric key. 2. Searchable public key. 
3. Secure Index. 4. Privacy preserving keyword search 
5. Privacy preserving multi keyword ranked search: k-
nearest neighbor technique. 6. Inner product similarity:  
Number of Query keywords appearing in a document. 
7. Conjunctive Search. 8. Disjunctive Search. 9. Single 
keyword searchable encryption. 10. Fuzzy searchable 
encryption. 11. Boolean keyword searchable 
encryption. 
Performance 1. Number of retrieved documents vs precision. 2. 
Number of retrieved documents vs privacy. 3. Number 
of docs vs number of distinct keywords in a dataset. 4. 
Number of docs in a dataset vs time of building index.       
5. Number of documents vs time of generating index. 
6. Number of keywords in query vs time of generating 
trapdoors. 
Keyword 
matching 
Coordinate matching: as many matches as possible. 
Evaluation 
parameters 
1. Access pattern. 2. Search Pattern. 3. Server search 
time. 4. Trapdoor used and its size. 5. Index Size. 6. 
Ranking Formula. 7. Document Length. 8. No of index 
words. 
Security and 
Consistency 
Based on hardness of breaking encryption methods. 
 
Conjunctive keyword search combines one or more 
keywords using AND conjunctive. For example, Bangalore 
AND Mangalore. Fuzzy keyword search matches exact 
keyword or closely matched keyword in database based on 
their semantics. Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 lists some of the 
known SE schemes, their type i.e. public key or private key, 
corresponding keyword search types, techniques used, 
search method, index organization etc. 
 
Table 5: Public Key Searchable Encryption Schemes 
 
Schemes 
(Year) 
 Keyword 
Search 
Type 
Based on Performance 
Measured 
through 
Boneh 
(2004) 
Conjunctive 
keyword 
Bilinear 
map, 
Identity 
Based 
Encryption 
(IBE), 
Decision 
Diffie-
Hellman 
assumption, 
General 
trapdoor 
Public key size 
permutation 
 
Golle 
(2004) 
Conjunctive 
keyword 
Decision 
Diffie-
Hellman 
assumption 
 
Encrypted key 
hardness 
Hwang 
(2007) 
Conjunctive 
keyword 
Decision 
Diffie-
Hellman 
assumption 
Shortest private 
key and cipher text 
size 
 
Boneh 
(2007) 
Conjunctive 
keyword 
Hidden 
Vector 
Encryption 
 
Ciphertext Size, 
Token Size 
Katz 
(2008) 
Conjunctive 
keyword 
Identity 
based 
encryption, 
Predicate 
encryption 
 
Secret key  and 
ciphertext security 
Shi 
(2007) 
Conjunctive 
keyword 
 
Predicate 
encryption 
Secret key security 
Chuah 
(2011) 
Fuzzy 
Keyword 
Search 
 
Bedtree 
approach 
Storage time 
 
Keita 
(2013) 
Oblivious 
keyword 
search 
 
Anonymous 
IBE 
Cost of encryption 
 
Li 
(2010) 
Fuzzy 
Keyword 
Search 
 
Edit 
distance 
Storage cost and 
searching cost 
Liu 
(2011) 
Fuzzy 
Keyword 
Search 
Edit 
distance 
Storage cost, index 
size, 
communication 
cost 
 
 
Table 6: Secret Key Searchable Encryption Schemes 
 
Schemes Year Keyword Search Type 
Curtmola  2006 Keyword 
Swaminathan 2007 Ranked Keyword 
Wang  2010 Ranked Keyword 
Zerr 2008 Ranked Keyword 
Yang  2011 Keyword 
Sun  2013 Ranked Keyword 
Chang 2005 Keyword 
Cao  2010 Ranked Keyword 
Bao 2008 Keyword 
Table 7: SE Schemes categorized based on search method 
and type of cryptosystem 
Search 
method 
Secret key Schemes/year Public key 
Schemes/year 
Linear : 
Search for 
each 
keyword 
linearly in 
database 
Agrawal/2004, 
A.Boldyreva/2009, 
O.Goldreich/1996, 
D.X.Song/2000. 
 
 
M.Bellare/2007, 
T.Fuhr/2007, 
D.Hofheinz/2008, 
 L. Ibraimi/2011, 
Q.Tang/2012, 
 
Index 
based : 
Search for 
each 
keyword 
based on 
index 
table 
F.Bao/2008, C.Bosch/2012, 
Y.Chang/2005, 
M.Chase/2010, 
R.Curtmola/2006, 
E.J.Goh/2003, 
P.Golle/2004, B.Hore/2012, 
M.Islam/2012, 
F.Kerschbaum/2011, 
M.Raykova/2011, 
E.Shen/2009  
J.Baek/2006, 
J.Baek/2008, 
D.Boneh/2004, 
D.Boneh/2007, 
Y.H.Hwang/2007, 
J.Katz/2008, 
H.S.Rhee/2010, 
Q.Tang/2009, 
R.Zhang/2007 
 
 
Table 8: Classification of SE methods based on query types 
 
Query type Schemes/year 
Equality Test: A query which 
searches for equality of 
keywords. For example rigid is 
equivalent to hard 
R.Agrawal/2004, J.Baek/2006, 
J.Baek/2008, F.Bao/2008, 
M.Bellere/2007, A.Boldyreva/2009, 
D.Boneh/2004, 
D.Boneh/2007,Y.Chang/2005, 
M.Chase/2010, R.Curtmola/2006, 
T.Fuhr/2007, E.J.Goh/2003, 
O.Goldreich/1996, P.Golle/2004, 
D.Hofheinz/2008, B.Hore/2012, 
Y.H.Hwang/2007, L.Ibraimi/2011, 
V.Iovino/2008, M.Islam/2012, 
J.Katz/2008,F.Kerschbaum/2011, 
M.Kuzu/2012, M.Raykova/2012, 
H.S.Rhee/2010, E.Shen/2009, 
R.Zhang/2007 
Conjunctive and Disjunctive: A 
query with conjunctive or 
disjunctive operators. For 
example, search for keywords 
Bangalore AND Mangalore  
 
D.Boneh/2007, P.Golle/2004, Y.H. 
Hwang/2007, V.Iovino/2008, 
J.Katz/2008 
Range: A range query is a 
common database operation that 
retrieves all records where 
some value is between an upper 
and lower boundary. For 
example, list all employees with 
3 to 5 years’ experience. 
 
R.Agrawal/2004, M.Bellere/2007, 
A.Boldyreva/2009, D.Boneh/2007, B. 
Hore/2012, M.Kuzu/2012 
 
 
Table 9: SE schemes based on indexing 
 
Schemes based on 
Index organized by 
keywords/year 
Schemes based on 
Index constructed 
per document/year 
Schemes based on 
Tree based index 
structure 
/year 
Curtmola/2006  Cao/2010  Comer/1979  
Kamara/2012 Chang/2005 Scheuermann/1982 
Swaminathan/2007  Goh/2003 Lu,y/2012 
Wang/2010  Hwang/2007  Sun /2013 
 
 
Table 10: Comparison of different SE schemes based on 
categories 
Category Schemes 
Keywor
d 
related 
/Year 
Conju
nction 
of 
keywo
rds 
relate
d 
schem
es/Yea
r 
Complex 
queries 
related 
schemes/Y
ear 
 
Single 
user: 
Cryptogr
aphic 
compone
nts are 
divided 
between 
user and 
the 
Song et 
al. /2000 
, Goh 
/2003 , 
Chang & 
Mitzenm
acher/20
05, 
Hacigum
us et al. 
Golle 
et al. 
/2004, 
Bosch 
et al./ 
2011  
 
Hore et al. 
/2004, 
Wang & 
Lakshmana
n /2006, 
Popa et 
al./2011 
 
server. 
Only one 
user has 
the key 
for 
encryptin
g, 
querying 
and 
decryptin
g data. 
Key is 
shared 
between 
user and 
server. 
/2005 
Semi 
fledged 
multi 
user: 
Writing 
operation 
on data 
can be 
done only 
by single 
user, 
other 
authorize
d users 
can 
perform 
read 
operation 
on data. 
Key is 
shared 
among 
users. 
Boneh et 
al./2004,
Curtmol
a et 
al./2006 
, Zhu et 
al. /2011 
Baek 
et al. 
/2008 
,Rhee 
et al. 
/2010 
,Cao et 
al. 
/2011 
Boneh & 
Waters/200
7, Katz et 
al. /2008, 
Yang et al. 
/2011, Li et 
al. /2011 
,Lu /2012  
 
Full-
fledged 
multi 
user: 
Writing 
and 
Reading 
Bao et 
al. /2008 
, Dong et 
al. /2008 
, Shao et 
al. /2010 
Hwang 
et al./ 
2007 
 
Muhammad 
Rizwan 
Asghar et 
al./2013 
 
operation 
on data 
can be 
done by 
all the 
users 
without 
sharing 
keys. 
 
 
 
Table 10 compares different schemes based on 
expressiveness of queries and keywords involving Single 
user, Semi fledged multi users or Full-fledged multi users 
[24]. 
 
SE schemes can be classified, designed and developed 
by using many of the above mentioned criteria’s or 
methods. In recent years more research is happening 
towards developing dynamic searchable encryption schemes 
with high efficiency. 
IV. PERFORMANCE 
Many techniques like Multi Party Computation, 
Oblivious RAM (ORAM), Searchable Symmetric 
encryption (SSE), Searchable Asymmetric Encryption 
(SAE), Functional Encryption (FE), Property Preserving 
Encryption (PPE), Homomorphic Encryption (HE), Fully 
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), ID based Encryption 
(IDE), Deterministic Encryption (DET) etc. have been used 
to perform computation and search on encrypted data. 
 
 The Graph 1 compares different algorithms with their 
efficiency and security. Here the efficiency is taken in terms 
of performance and security in terms of hardness of 
breaking encryption methods.  PPE is more efficient but less 
secured. While FHE is less efficient but more secured. SSE 
falls in between PPE and FHE i.e. SSE efficiency is more 
compared to FHE but less secured than FHE. 
 
It looks SE is a better tradeoff between security and 
efficiency. SE does a very fast parallel and I/O efficient 
keyword search compared to HE, FE, FHE and ORAM.  
The leaking of certain information by adversaries is the 
main drawback of SE schemes. Adversaries exploit access 
patterns and search patterns to leak the information. Hence 
more research needs to be focused on securing access and 
search patterns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Searchable scheme comparison 
PPE/DET
SSE
FE/IBE
FHE1
ORAM
FHE2Ef
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Graph 1. FHE Schemes Comparison
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Cloud computing is an approach to get hardware or 
software in a cost effective way.  Cloud computing is used 
as a utility model like electricity, where we pay for what we 
use. Since Cloud is maintained by third parties, security and 
privacy plays a vital role in making cloud a popular and 
successful technology. To provide confidentiality and 
privacy for our data in cloud we need to concentrate and 
study different cryptosystems available for use in literature. 
SE and HE algorithms are most popular cryptosystems used 
in cloud. HE methods are highly secured but less efficient 
compared to SE methods, whereas SE methods are more 
efficient and less secured compared to HE methods. SE is a 
best tradeoff between efficiency and security. By 
considering different criteria’s of SE methods one can 
devise a new efficient hybrid algorithm to improve the 
hardness of security as close as possible to FHE methods. 
 
In future, one can explore efficient SE techniques that 
work on encrypted data in cloud, for both single user and 
multi user environment. 
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